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element in the construction o f the European Union. The paper gives an overview 
on the key actors and institutions o f  Labour Relations System (LRS) with special 
focus on the micro- small and médium sized enteprises (SME). In the first 
section, the author describes the key social partners and institutions o f  the LRS 
in the countries participating in an international research project carried out in 
2003-2006 and supported by the Leonardo Programme o f  the EU (Annex 1). 
The second section o f the paper deals with the particular features o f  the LRS in 
the SME sector. The strong “informality” o f social dialogue is the key 
institutional pattern o f LRS in the SME sector.
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Foreword
The aim of the project supported by the Leonardo programme of the European 
Commission was to develop a research-based intemational comparative training 
curriculum about the SME sectors in eight European participant countries: 
Belgium, Francé, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Spain and the UK. The 
results of the fist project phase is summarised in an International Comparative 
Report (CR). This analysis is focusing on the such social regulatory institutions 
of firms’ behaviour as the Labour Relations System (LRS).
1. Introduction: somé remarks on the varieties of european 
industrial relations
Prior to identify and understand the main features and trends in the development 
of labour relations1, we would like to stress the core importance of social 
dialogue in the construction of the European social and economic space. 
Adopting the importance of the partnership approach both at EU- and national 
level, we recognise the joint responsibility of various actors fór the necessary 
social and economic changes within the context of intense globalised 
competitive pressure.
In mapping the changing diversity of the characteristics of the Labour Relations 
System (LRS), we would like to use the following analytical dimensions:
1. Social actors, that is trade unions, employers’ organisations, and other types 
of interest representatives associations.
2. Institutions, that is collective agreement (e.g. coverage rate, level of 
coordination), wage bargaining, institutions of employees’ participation (e.g. 
works council), national tripartite institutions, industrial actions (e.g. strikes).
Beside the descriptive analyses of the roles of actors and institutions, we intend 
to identify and illustrate several trends (decentralisation, changing forms of 
coordination and cooperation, etc.) which are shaping the present and fiiture 
practice of labour relations at European and country level, especially in the SME 
sector. The first and second sections of this analysis provide a generál overview 
of the actors (e.g. interest representative organisations both of employees and 
employers) and the formai institutions of the LRS (e.g. collective bargaining
1 In the standard publications, the term of ‘industrial relations’ is used almost exclusively. 
Contrary to this practice, we intend to use ‘labour relation’ instead of the notion of 
‘industrial relations’. In our view, the term of ‘labour relations’ is seem to us as more 
generál and it indicates the growing importance of the idea and practice o f social 
partnership nőt only in the field of traditional industrial economic activities bút in the 
service sector and especially in the fást growing branches o f the New Economy.
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coverage rate, etc.). The third section is focusing the on the labour relations in 
the SMEs sector.
2. Actors and institutions: An international comparison at 
european and country levels
2.1. Trade unions and institution (works council) o f employees’ 
participation
Before giving a generál outline on the main characteristics of actors and 
institutions it is necessary to make distinction among national LRS according 
the roles of the trade unions and the employees’ participation in the firm. 
According to these two dimensions the following pattems should be 
distinguished (Industrial Relation in Europe, 2004: 21):
1. The ‘single channel system’, where the workplace representation of 
employees (i.e. rights to information, consultation or co-determination) is 
controlled exclusively by the trade unions. The advantage of this system fór 
employees’ representation relies in its simplicity and the lack of rivalry between 
the two channels of employees’ workplace representation (e.g. Poland and UK 
illustrate well the ‘single channel systems’, bút based on the voluntary 
principle.) However, the ‘single channel system’ of employees’ representation 
does nőt deal with the problems of non-union members, and employees in non- 
unionised firms are excluded firom the collective representation (e.g information, 
consultation and/or co-decisions).
2. The so-called ‘mixed channel system ’ in which the workplace representation 
of the non-union members is achieved by the trade unions or through a 
supplementary channel in the non-unionised companies (e.g. in Poland the 
govemment supports the establishment of works councils, independent from the 
trade unions because of the opposition of both certain unions and employers.)
3. In the case of the of the ‘dual channel system’ the Labour Law provides a 
separate channel of employees’ participation -  additional to trade unión 
representation. This duality of LRS characterises the majority of countries 
participating in the Leonardo Project: Belgium, Francé, Germany, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Spain and Poland (in this latter country works councils exist only in 
state owned firms). In the countries where the ‘dual channel system’ operates, a 
kind of rivalry can be identified between the works council and trade unions. 
(Makó 2001.) However, “in reality lay unión officials and representatives tend 
to play a leading role in the councils and councils may be a recruitment ground 
fór trade unions. Works councils tend to be highly unionised and in council 
elections the trade unión candidates tend to attract votes from members and non- 
members alike. Another encouraging sign is that voter tumout in workplace 
election tends to be high, between 65 and 85 % ... in the new Member States
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(NMS) only ... in Hungary and Slovenia are councils comparable with the fully- 
fledged types in EU-15.” (Industrial Relations in Europe 2004:21-23).
This section provides an overview on the trade unión density rates and on the 
unión structures and affiliation. In relation with the density rates, significant 
differences were identified betweens such global economies as Europe, USA 
and Japan bút among the countries of the EU 25 as well. As we expected, the 
unión density rate (2001) is much higher in the EU (25) 26.4 % in comparison 
with USA 12.9 % and Japan 20.9 %. Among the countries participating in the 
Leonardo project substantial differences were found, too. The highest 
unionisation rate was registered in Belgium 55.8 % (2001) followed by Slovakia 
35.4 % (2002) and UK 30.4 % (2002), than in Germany 23.2 % (2002) and 
Hungary 19.9 % (2002). The lowest trade unión density rates were identified in 
Poland 14.7 % (2001) and Francé 9.7 % (2001). In addition, we have to note that 
the unión density rates are varying substantially by the priváté and the public 
sectors. Fór example Hungary, Francé, Poland and Slovakia more than every 
second unión members are working in the public sectors. The higher density 
rates in the public sectors are explained partly by the institutional heritage of the 
pást in the post-socialist countries became EU members ( l st May 2004) and the 
difficulties of trade unions to hire members in the priváté sector, especially in 
the SME sector and in the newly established firms (i.e. companies established in 
the form of the “green-field” investments). (Makó-Novoszáth, 1995.) (See Table 
1!)
Table 1. Trade unión density rates and membership composition, 1995-2002
Union density rates Change Share of all members
1990 1995 2002 1995-2002 Female Public
Belgium 53.9 55.7 55.8* +0.1 n. d. n. d.
Francé 10.1 9.8 9.7* -0.1 48.3** 66.3**
Germany 31.2 29.2 23.2 -0.9 31.2 39.3
Spain 14.7 16.3 14.9(1999) -0.1 n. d. 31.2**
Hungary n. d. 63.4 19.9 -6.2 48.7** 70.3**
Poland n. d. 32.9 14.7 -18.2 55.1** 76.6**
Slovakia 78.7 57.3 35.4 -43.3 49.6** 70.9**
UK 39.3 34.1 30.4 -8.9 43.7 47.4
Average EU-
2 5 * * * n. d. 32.6 26.4* -6.2 n. d. n. d.
Average EU- 32.8 31.0 27.3* -5.5 n. d. n. d.
Average EU-
i o * * * n. d. 42.7 20.4* -22.3 n. d. n. d.
NB: Density rates fór EU-15 countries are standardised, i.e. without unemployed and self- 
employed, retired employees and student members, along the model in B. Ebbinghaus and J. 
Visser (2000) The societies of Europe, quoted by ‘Industrial Relations in Europe: 2004’, p.
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19. In the case of the UK, fígures are calculated from the Labour Force Survey. Elsewhere 
they are recalculated from administrative sources. See alsó OECD, Employment Outlook 
2004, Chapter 3 (‘Wage-setting outcomes and institutions’), Paris, July 2004. The EU-10 
fígures are non-standardised and follow nationally based statistics collected by the Institut des 
Sciences du Travail of the Université Catholique de Louvain, Monographs on the Situation of 
social partners in the candidate countries, Brussels, December 2003, a research project 
conducted on behalf of the Employment and Social Affairs DG of the European Commission. 
Quoted by ‘Industrial Relations in Europe’, 2004: 19. Table 1 is an edited version of the 
original one containing data only fór countries involved in the Leonardo Project.
‘Data available only from 2001.
** The data on membership composition (share of female members; share o f members in the 
public sector) are calculated from sample surveys o f the International Social Science 
Programme (ISSP) and relate to 1998.
***Weighted averages. In the case o f missing data, the nearest year is taken intő account.
Evaluating the pattems of trade unión structures and affiliations in the countries 
involved in the Leonardo Project we distinguished the following two structural 
settings. In the first group of the countries surveyed, “single or dominant” trade 
unión confederation coordinates the activities of the branch organisations. This 
group of countries comprises Germany, UK and Slovakia. In the second group 
of countries trade unión centres are divided on political and ideological basis. 
Fór example in Francé and Spain “political divide” exist within the broad left or 
these division, others relate to such ideological orientation as Christian and 
Social Democratic values. In the such NMS like Hungary and Poland trade 
unión centres have links with both right and left parties (e.g. in Hungary, 
“National Alliance of Works Councils” has links with the Democratic Fórum 
and the “National Association of Hungárián Trade Unions” maintain rather 
strong links with the Hungárián Socialist Party.) Further fragmentation of the 
trade unión centres could be observed in somé countries. Főre example in 
Francé, there are separate centres fór managerial and white collar staffs and 
régiónál division is noticeable in Spain. (See the Table 2!)2
Comparing the pattems of trade unión structures, affiliation and characteristics 
of the recent modemisation of the unión organisation (e.g. organisational 
decentralisation -  fragmentation or concentration-merger) we may identify nőt 
only contrasting bút non-synchronised movements. Fór example, at the 
beginning of the XXIst century (2001) in Germany, the autonomous generál 
trade unión of white-collar employees merged with the well-known Germán 
Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB). A similar major unión merger took piacé 
in the UK (2002), too. The creation of these ‘conglomerate’ unions was the
2 Naturally there are other organizational principles o f the interest representative 
organisations. Fór example in another group o f the countries -  whose members did nőt 
participate in the Leonardo Project -  trade unión centres are created on the occupational 
basis (e.g. Finland, Sweden, Denmark etc.).
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answer of the trade unions in the EU-15 countries to the extemal social and 
economic changes (e.g. to better cope with the growing need fór coordination 
among trade unions in their confrontation-cooperation with the employers and 
their associations.) The creation of the ‘conglomerate’ or ‘mega’ trade unions 
should be interpreted as an initiative which may counterbalance the increased 
discretionary power of employers opened to them by the disintegration of both 
extemal and internál constraints.
Table 2. Union structure and affiliation patterns in the EU
Country
Main unión confederations*1* Affiliates<2)
N°
Main divisions 
between 
confederations
Share
of
largest
N°
Main divisions 
between 
confederations
Share of all 
members
Belgium 3 political-religious 50 17 sector&status 2
Francé 6<7) polit-relig&occup. 28 20 sector 12
Germany 1® private&public 83 8 sector 17
Spain JÍ3) Political 41 12 sector 19
Hungary 6 Political 31 42 sector 1
Poland 3 Political 43 110 sector&company ?
Slovakia 1 ? 95 37 sector 5
UK 1 ? 84 71 occup.&sector 16
Only confederations that organise in several sectors and organise 5% or more of totál 
membership.
2Affiliates or member unions belonging to the largest confederation, only national unions 
(without local organisations).
3Without 36 affíliated unions in Northern Ireland.
Including Turkish Cypriot organisations in Northern Cyprus.
Source: B. Ebbinghaus and J. Visser (2000) The societies of Europe. Trade 
unions in western Europe since 1945, Palgrave fór the main divisions and 
demarcations in EU-15, updates with information from unions’ websites 
(number of unions) and AIAS unión file. Fór EU-10 Member States, 
information is obtained from Commission research (UCL). Quoted by Industrial 
Relations in Europe 2004: 15. Table 2 is an edited version of the original one 
containing data only fór countries involved in the Leonardo Project.
In other words, the merger process of trade unions can be evaluated as an 
institutional answer of the employees’ interest representative organisations to 
counterbalance the effects of deregulation and the associated destabilisation of 
rules and procedures of the labour markét within and outside firms. The 
concentration -  merger of trade unión confederations was partly an attempt to 
cope with the difficulties resulting from growing internál flnancial diffículties 
and the declining trade unión membership, too. In the NMS participating in the 
Leonardo Project we may identify contradictory tendencies. During state 
socialism employees were forced to be trade unión members (e.g. the
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unionisation rate was artificially high, over 90 %) and the trade unions operating 
in various economic branches were centralised intő one national level centre 
(e.g. in Hungary this ‘mega’ centre was called the ‘National Council of Trade 
Unions’, in Hungárián: “Szakszervezetek Országos Tanácsa’ -SZOT). As a 
natural reaction to this kind of ‘forced’ centralization-bureaucratization of trade 
unions, following the collapse of the state-socialist political-economical régimé, 
in these countries the ‘decentralization-fragmentation’ became the mainstream 
tendency. As a result of the breaking down of the former single-centre, we 
witnessed the emergence of numerous new trade unión centres. (See the Table
3.!) However, in the last years there has been an attempt to rationalise and 
centralise the decentralised and fragmented trade unión structures (e.g. in 
Hungary and Poland).
Table 3. Employees representation and employees rights: single, mixed and dual 
versions o f the LRS
Country Basis Single M iied Dual Unioncompetition
Separate
unión
workplace
represen­
tation
Belgium L&C Y Considerable Normally
Francé L Y Very strong Frequently
Germany L Y Marginal Sometimes
Spain L Y Very strong Normally
Hungary L Y Very strong Normally
Poland L Y Very strong N.A.
Slovakia L Y Marginal Sometimes
UK A Somé - N.A.
NB: Basis fór employees representation rights: central agreement = C; agreement 
(sector/company) = A; law = L, Yes = Y, Nőt applicable = N.A.
Source: Industrial Relations in Europe 2004: 22.
Evaluating the existence of the employees’ participation institutions (e.g. works 
councils) beside the interest representative roles of the trade unión, we made 
distinction between “single”, “mixed” and “dual systems”. (See Table 4.!) In the 
in the majority of the Leonardo Project countries the “dual” - Belgium, Francé, 
Germany, Hungary and Slovakia - and in Poland, UK the “single” version of the 
Labour Relations System operates. Evén in the countries where works councils 
as an institution of the employees’ information and consultation systems do 
exist, “... itself differs significantly írom country to country in terms of 
composition, decision-making, election procedures, thresholds, roles and power 
of the employees representative bodies. (Carley -  Baradel -  Weltz, 2004:4).
The common elements of the various national works council definitions found in 
the EU-15 countries summarised in Box 1.
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Box 1. Works councils definition
Permanent elected bodies o f workforce representatives (or occasionally joint committee with 
employees representatives), set-up on the basis o f law or collective agreements with the 
overall task of promoting cooperation within the enterprise fór the benefit o f the enterprise 
itself and employees by creating and maintaining good and stable employment conditions, 
increasing welfare and security o f employees and their understanding of enterprise operations, 
fináncé and competitiveness. (Carley et.al 2004:9)______________________________________
In relation with the establishment of works council, in all European countries -  
with the exception of Sweden -  there is a minimum workforce-size threshold fór 
the creation of this institution of the participation. In the Leonardo Project 
countries, the lowest threshold fór works councils’ establishment is in Germany 
5 employees, in Francé, Hungary and Spain 50 persons and in Belgium 100 
employees. In UK there is no generál or statutory system of information and 
consultation. Beside the “threshold” the other essential feature of works councils 
is the following: either this institutions of employees’ participation is established 
automatic in all establishment satisfying the threshold criteria or must be 
triggered (or initiated) by social actors of labour relations (e.g. employees, trade 
unions or employers). The establishment process in these countries basically 
automatic as Belgium and Francé bút in the majority of the countries must be 
initiated by employees/trade unions: Hungary, Germany, Poland and Spain.
In spite the fact that the minimum size in somé countries do nőt exist, hoever in 
the majority of the countries involved in the Leonardo Project, the threshold is 5, 
50 or 100 employees -  these workforce-sizes are covering the small and 
medium-sized firms. In spite the various threshold conceming the establishment 
of works councils, this important participatory fórum is dominant mainly in the 
large firms (LSE). Evén the law provides basis fór works councils in such 
countries as Germany, Francé, Hungary and Spain, in the SMEs only tiny 
minority of firms establish works councils. “In Germany, fór example, the law 
provides statutory rights in firms with five or more employees. The 
establishment of a works council is nőt mandatory and according to survey 
figures from 2002, works councils cover just 11 % of all firms and 50 % of all 
employees within the law’s scope. Coverage is related to the size and the age of 
the finn, with smaller and newer firms much less likely to have established a 
works council... In Francé, the Ministry of Labour estimates that of small firms 
(10-19 employees) less than 20 % have a form of workplace representation fór 
employees. This percentage increases to 56 % fór firms with 20-49 employees 
and to 90 % in firms with more than 50 employees.” (Industrial Relations in 
Europe 2004:22.) The situation is rather similar in Hungary. However, the 
relation between the size of the firms and the existence of works councils call 
attention to another vitai issue. The rate of the presence of the works councils 
has strong relations with the trade unión presence in the firms surveyed. 
According to the date of a statistically representative survey carried out in 2002 
in Hungary, the share of works councils, trade unions and collective agreements
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are indicating the similar trend: their share is increasing with the size of the 
fírms. (See the Table 4.!)
The statistical analysis on the works councils does nőt provide information on 
the difficulties of everyday company practice related to the function of this 
employees’ participatory institution. Fór example, in countries where the labour 
code guarantees the rights of works councils (and their members) in regulating 
the fields of co-decision (e.g. social infrastructure), these rights are sometimes 
violated even in large firms operating in such very established sector as 
chemical industry.
Table 4. Distribution o f  works councils, trade unions and collective agreements 
by size category o f firms in the manufacturing sector in hungary (2002)
Size of the firm 
(persons)
N° of 
responders
Works councils Trade Unions Collectiveagreements
N° % N° % N° %
50-99 1,082 288 27 261 26 243 23
100-249 882 456 52 389 46 359 41
Moe than 249 632 531 84 511 82 469 74
Totál 2,596 1,275 1,161 1,071
Source: Benyó, B. A.: munkavállalói részvétel intézménye: az üzemi tanácsok helyzete 
Magyarországon, (Institution of Emplyees’ Participation: Situation of Works Councils in 
Hungary), PhD Dissertation, Budapest: Budapest University o f Economic Sciences and 
Business Administration -  Department o f Social Policy and Sociology, p.75.
2.2. Affiliations and organisations of employers: national and european 
level comparison
The existence and activities of employers’ interest representative associations 
(organisations) are strongly influencing singular or multi-employers’ bargaining 
and, consequently, the coverage rate of collective agreements. The 
organisational building up of employers’ associations varies across the countries 
participating in the Leonardo Project. In relation with the organisations of 
employers, it is worth calling attention to the dual structure of these 
organisations. The single structure operating at cross-industry level exists in 
Belgium, Francé, Slovakia, Spain and in the UK. Contrary to the previous 
countries, Germany represents a national case with a division of tasks and 
responsibilities -  at the national level -  between collective interest
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representation (i.e. that are partners in collective bargaining) and trade interests 
(i.e. chamber of trade and commerce, etc.).3
The most radical restructuring process took piacé in the Post-socialist economies 
during the 1990s following the collapse of state-socialist 'régimé'. Aftermath 
the privatisation, in relation to the deconstruction-decentralisation of the former 
mono-system of employers’ organisations, a proliferation of employers’ 
organisations have taken piacé.4 As a result of this process, we may register 
three employers’ organisations in Poland and six or more in Hungary. Among 
various problems related to the role of business and employers’ associations in 
the New Member States, we would like to stress the underdevelopment of sector 
level bargaining: ‘This is due to the fact that in most of these countries sectoral 
employers’ organisations are either weak and lack the necessary resources to 
participate or that they are denied the authority to conclude sectoral agreements 
on behalf of their members, as is ofiten the case fór instance in Hungary and in 
Poland.’5 However, in Hungary, to overcome the lack of sector level social 
dialogue, an EU-funded (PHARE, 2001-2004) project was launched aimed to 
create autonomous sector (branch) level institution of social dialogue. This new 
institution within the Hungárián LRS would have a role to support sector level 
consultations among the social actors, increasing the number of sector level 
collective agreements.6
Evaluating the representation of employers’ interest at EU level, the ‘ Union des 
Industries de la Communauté Européenne' (UNICE -  since 1987 this 
organisation fulfils the role of ‘Industrial and Employers’ Association’) covers 
almost all the main national cross-industry confederations of competitive 
(priváté) sector employers. In addition to the EU-15 countries, majority of the
3 Note: in somé region, fór instance in Bavaria, the two structures have been integrated. In 
this relation, it is necessary to mention that rationalisation process have been identified at 
the levels below the peak associations. This process includes on one hand mergers of 
employers’ organisations and trade interests, and on the other hand integration of 
employers’ association representing neighbouring sectors (e.g. notable number of mergers 
at the levels below of peak associations were reported in the UK). Source: Industrial 
Relations in Europe, 2004. :26.
4 In relation to the membership of employers’ organisations, we would like to note the 
followings: nőt counting countries where the membership of employers’ organisation is 
obligatory by the law, the average organisation rate is 60%. Though, this average hides 
significant differences across countries participating in the Leonardo Project. Fór example, 
extremely organisation rates (70% or more) were found in Belgium, Francé and Spain. 
Below the average (40%) characterises the British employers’ organisations. In somé 
countries no data were available (e.g. Hungary, Poland).
5 Source: Industrial Relations in Europe, 2004.: 27.
6 Foglalkoztatáspolitikai és Munkaügyi Minisztérium (Ministry fór Employment Policy and 
Labour), 2004: 5.
182 JEEMS 2/2006
Csaba Makó/Péter Csizmadia/Miklós Illéssy
NMS countries alsó have representation in this organisation (e.g. Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia). Continuing the distinctions we made between employers’ 
organisations and trade association, the UNICE acts as both types of 
organisation. In other words, it is engaging in social dialogue and negotiations 
with European Trade Union Council (ETUC) and as a trade association 
promoting its members’ interests in influencing EU decision-makers on great 
variety of issues (e.g. see the debate on the Chinese textile quota in the European 
U Reviewing the situation of European level representation of employers’ 
organisations in the SME sector, it is important to stress the following 
characteristics. There is a separate European-level institution representing the 
particular interests of SME sector: European Association of Craft and Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises (UEAPME). This European-level body representing 
SMEs has 77 national member organisations in EU-15 countries. In the NMS 
only Hungary is admitted as a full member. All other NMS has only observer 
status (see in details Table 5.!)
Table 5. Europe ’s business and employers ’ association affiliation, organisation 
rates and participation in social dialogue
N°
0)
Member
UNICE
Affilia­
tes
N° ^
Organi 
-sation 
rate(í>
Partiéi
social
pátion in 
dialogue UEAPME
CEEP
mem­
ber?Bipar
-tite
Tripar-
tite
Belgium 1 VBO-FEB 33 72 Y Y
UNIZO, UCM, 
CC, PME-SDI, 
KAN
y <4 >
Francé 1 MEDEF 87 74 N Y APCM, UPA, CGPME Y
Germany 2 BDA,BDI 54 63 N Y
ZDH-BFD,
BDS-DgeV Y
Spain 1 CEOE 148 72 Y Y
CEPYME, 
PIME, PIMEC 
SEFES
Y
Hungary 4 (CEHIC) 43 N Y (IPOSZ) Y
Poland 2 KPP,(PKPP) Y Y (ZRP) N
Slovakia 1 AZZRSR 37 65 N Y (SZZ) N
UK 1 CBI 150 40 N 00 UIC Y
NB: (1) General associations, without organisations specialising in representing 
agriculture, horticulture and fishery; cooperatives; SMEs, fmancial enterprises, and 
nationalised firms or local govemment; public sector, organisations representing public 
firms or special sectors, such as fináncé and banking. (2) Only sectoral affiliates or 
companies, without régiónál affiliates. (3) Expressed as a percentage of wage and 
salaried employees working in organised firms. Members with observer status between 
brackets. (4) Benelux.
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Sources: Reports and websites of UNICE, CEEP and UEAPME; supplemented with 
information from F.Traxler, S. Blaschke and B. Kittel (2001), National labour relations in 
intemationalised markets, op.cit., and the Institut des Sciences du Travail o f the Université 
Catholique de Louvain, Monographs on the situation of social partners in the candidate 
countries, Brussels, December 2003, a research project conducted on behalf o f the 
Employment and Social Affairs DG of the European Commission. Quoted by Industrial 
Relations in Europe, 2004: 25. Table 5. is an edited version of the original one containing 
data only fór countries involved in the Leonardo Project
2.3. Collective bargaining and social dialogue: particular focus on wage 
bargaining
This section reviews the key institutions regulating the relations between 
employers (employers’ organisations) and employees’ interest representative 
associations (trade unión). In this relation, we have to make distinction between 
the following institutions:
1 .Collective bargaining
2 Consultation
3 Social dialogue
In dealing with these institutions, we intend to focus mainly on the issues of 
collective bargaining (fór example: coverage rate, legal extension of collective 
agreements, wage bargaining, etc.) and the role of tripartite bodies as a particular 
form of social dialogue. In the previous section we have already given details of 
various features of works councils as a key form of consultation; therefore this 
section does nőt deal with this form of collective representation.
Evaluating the practice of collective bargaining, there are noticeable differences 
in the conditions and the impacts of collective bargaining both in EU-15 and 
NMS countries involved in the Leonardo Project.
Box 2. ILO defínition of Collective Agreement
ILO Convention No 98 of 1949 defines collective bargaining as ‘voluntary negotiations 
between employers or employers' organisations and workers’ organisations, with a view to 
the reguládon of terms and conditions by collective agreements’. Collective bargaining is thus 
a rulemaking process based on joint decisions between independent organisations. When 
successful, it results in agreements which specify the collective rules and conditions applying 
to employment and employment relations in firms, i.e. conditions of work and rules goveming 
the relations between employees and managers. Additionally, agreements usually alsó defme 
the relationship between the negotiating organisations, fór instance with regard to the renewal 
of agreements, dispute procedures, peace obligations, recognition and facilities. All this has 
no counterpart in individual bargaining between workers and managers.
Source: Industrial Relations in Europe, 2004, 29._______________________________________
Prior to the presentation of the coverage rate of collective bargaining both at 
European and country levels, we have to raise briefly somé methodological 
problems. The collective bargaining coverage rate operationally refers to the 
number of employees covered by a collective agreement (CA) as a proportion of
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all wage- and salary-eamers employed. It is a widely accepted view among the 
Labour Relations experts that bargaining coverage rate indicates the reál 
bargaining strengths of the trade unions conceming the employment and 
working conditions (the unión density rate is reflecting only the potential 
bargaining power of organised employees).
There are several important factors influencing the collective bargaining 
coverage rate and its measurement (see in detail these methodological problems, 
in Industrial Relation in Europe, 2004: 30.). Table 6 illustrates the national 
(aggregate) rates of collective bargaining coverage, the employers’ 
organisations’ and unión
Table 7. Collective bargaining coverage, employers ’ organisations and unión 
density density.
1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 81-90 91-100
Belgium U E Cov
Francé u E Cov
Ger­
many u
Cov,
E
Spain u E Cov
Hungary u Cov
Poland u Cov,E
Slovakia U Cov
UK u Cov,E
NB: Cov = bargaining coverage non-standardised; E = employer organisation rate 
(priváté sector); U = Union density rate. Quoted by Industrial Relations in Europe 2004:
31. Table 7 is an edited version of the original one containing data only fór countries 
involved in the Leonardo Project.
When comparing the collective bargaining coverage rates with the unión density 
rates, we identified the following pattems:
1 The collective bargaining coverage rate is nőt only more stable bút at least 
twice as high as the unión density rate. This difference calls attention to the 
cáréiul interpretation of the unión density rate in relation to strengths and 
mobilisation capacity of trade unión.
2 Comparing the coverage rate of the EU-15 and NMS countries we found a 
striking gap: the EU-15 countries -  in spite of their massive variation írom 
100% (Francé) to 36% (the UK) -  the aggregated average rate is rather high 
(weighted average rate fór EU-15 countries is 78%). In the case of NMS -  with 
the exception of Slovenia (100%) -  a decline in collective bargaining coverage 
has been identified during the transformation of 1990s and today. Fór example, 
according to “a recent statistical study of the Ministry of Employment and 
Labour in Hungary reported a further 5-point drop in the coverage rate írom 45
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to 40% between 2001 and 2002 (unadjusted rates). According to the study, this 
suggests that private-sector employers may be withdrawing from wage 
negotiations and that the current company bargaining structure provides no 
stable framework.” (Industrial Relations in Europe, 2004: 32.)7
3 In relation to the lower collective bargaining coverage rate in the NMS 
countries, we have to note that the declining coverage rate was especially strong 
in the so-called post-socialist economies. This decline was particularly deep in 
comparison with the 100% coverage rate of the state-socialist firms based on the 
obligatory membership of both trade unión and chamber of commerce, trade and 
industry.
2.3.1. Role o f  extension in collective bargaining
It is nőt unusual fór employers to voluntarily extend negotiating agreements to 
both unionised and non-union workers. This non-discriminatory extension of 
collective agreements to employees working in the same firms is recommended 
as a ‘best practice’ by the ILO Recommendation N 91 of 1951. The following 
box describes the legal or administrative regulations conceming the extension of 
negotiated agreements to both unión and non-union members.
There are great variations in the procedures related to the extension of collective 
agreements. Public authorities, such as Ministries of Labour, play a decisive role 
in initiating the extension in Francé, in Spain and to somé extent in Slovakia. 
‘Several countries have established minimum requirements fór extension, most 
commonly minimum rates fór coverage of the relevant agreement prior to 
extension’8 -  this practice is used fór example in Germany, Hungary and Spain. 
Table 8 summarises the various procedures related to the legal and 
administrative regulation of extension of collective agreements.
A 2002 EIRO study provides a generál view on the practice of extension of 
collective agreements. The key lessons of this survey should be summarised in 
the following way: high stability and continuity of extension provisions are 
characterising the EU-15 and somé of the candidate countries. Before presenting 
interesting cases covering somé of the countries participating in the Leonardo 
Project, we have to indicate that the last years were characterised by intensified 
debates on the extension of collective bargaining (e.g. Francé, Germany, 
Hungary and Poland).
7 It is necessary to mention that in many cases employees are coping with the problem of the 
delays in payment, underpayment, even where collective agreements exist. In Poland, fór 
example, according to one govemment survey two thirds of audited companies in breach 
of contract including both small and large sized companies (Industrial Relations in Europe, 
2004: 32.)
8 Industrial Relations in Europe, 2004: 34.
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Box 3. ILO recommendation on the extension of collective agreement
(1) Where appropriate, having regard to established collective bargaining practice, measures, 
to be determined by national laws or regulations and suited to the conditions of each country, 
should be taken to extend the application of all or certain stipulations of a collective 
agreement to all the employers and workers included within the industrial and territorial 
scope of the agreement.
(2) National laws or regulations may make the extension o f a collective agreement subject to 
the following, among other, conditions;
(a) that the collective agreement already covers a number of the employers and workers 
concemed which is, in the opinion o f the competent authority, sufficiently representative;
(b) that, as a generál rule, the request fór extension of the agreement shall be made by one or 
more organisations of workers or employers who are parties to the agreement;
(c) that, prior to the extension of the agreement, the employers and workers to whom the 
agreement would be made applicable by its extension should be given an opportunity to 
submit their observations.
Source: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/recdisp 1 .htm__________________________________
Table 8. Legal or administrative extension o f  collective agreements
Belgium
Extension is automatic if  agreements are signed by all parties in Joint 
Industry Councils or in the National Labour Council. I f  nőt, the Ministry can 
extend multi-employer agreements by royal decree on application of one or 
more bargaining parties.
Francé
On the request o f one or more of the bargaining parties, addressed to the 
National Commission on Collective Bargaining, the Minister can extend 
agreements to entire sectors and/or enlarge agreements to different 
geographical regions or other economic sectors.
Germany
On the application of one or more of the bargaining parties and approved by 
a special committee fór extensions, and if more than 50 % of the workforce 
is already covered, the Ministry can extend agreements to the entire sector. 
Since 1998, and only in the construction industry, the Ministry can extend 
minimum wage provisions at its own initiative.
Spain
Extension is automatic throughout the agreement’s domain if signed by a 
majority o f the representatives of each party to the agreement. Upon request 
by unions and/or employers, the Ministry can enlarge the agreement in cases 
where no bargaining exists.
Hungary
On application of one or more of the bargaining parties and after 
consultation with the subcommittee of the National Interest Reconciliation 
Committee, the Ministry can extend agreements to the entire sector. 
Applicants must provide proof of their representativity in the sector 
concemed.
Poland The Ministry can extend multi-employer agreements to cover unaffiliated employers in a particular sector, if  considered ‘a vitai social interest’.
Slovakia
On the application of one or more of the bargaining parties and 
recommended by a special tripartite committee fór extension, the Ministry 
can extend agreements to employers with similar business activities and 
economic and social conditions
UK No practice of extension of private-sector wage agreements. All extension provisions were abolished in the 1980.
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Source: F.Traxler and M. Behrens (2002), ‘Collective bargaining coverage and 
extension procedures’; EIRO - Eironline; OECD (2004),‘Wage setting institutions’, in 
Employment Outlook, Paris, 17. Quoted by Industrial Relations in Europe, 2004: 33.
Table 8 is an edited version o f the original one containing data only fór countries 
involved in the Leonardo Project.
2.3.2. Changing forms o f coordination in the bargaining process: the case o f  
wage bargaining
From the 1990s, the pattem of decentralisation became the mainstream feature 
of industrial relations. Under the pressure of global competition, the 
restructuring process of companies on a national, European or global level is 
further driven by the utilisation of fást changes in the global value chain. 
European integration speeded up in the last year ( l st May 2004), in particular 
making it possible fór companies to re-orientate their activities directly at a 
supranational markét. Costs can be cut by selecting the most favourable 
locations using such enablers as ICT (e.g. through outsourcing or delocalisation 
of generic business functions). Companies are focusing on their core activities 
and seeking to outsource others. Cooperation between small and medium-sized 
companies can be facilitated both by technological and social innovations. These 
are tools to improve both employment and organisational flexibility. 
Unfortunately, in the flexibility debate relatively little attention was paid to the 
role of wage bargaining.9 However, wage issues had and continue to have a 
central importance in the debates and wage-related conflicts often occurring in 
relation to employers’ and employees’ everyday working practices.
However, it would be important nőt to exaggerate this underestimated role of 
Labour Relations. In the last quarter of the century, in many countries 
bargaining on the working time reduction represented the trend of 
decentralisation. Beside the working time reduction, the wage negotiations are 
shifting intő the focus of decentralisation of collective bargaining. The next 
quotation describes well the underlying economic, technological and 
organisational drivers/enablers favouring the decentralisation of Labour 
Relations: “(...) intemationalisation, technological and organisational change, 
multi-tasking, teamwork and client-related work processes have made 
standardised solutions, negotiated fór entire sectors, less feasible and efficient 
(...) it has become more important fór intemationally competing firms to have 
the freedom to react speedily to wage competition from foreign firms. The 
introduction of performance related pay, and payment by results, has alsó 
supported the demand fór company level bargaining.” (Industrial Relations in 
Europe, 2004: 36-37.)
9 The works representing the exceptions are the followings: Crouch/Traxler (1995), 
Lindbeck/Snower (2001), Yamamura/Streeck (2003).
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Table 9 reviewing the levels and duration of collective bargaining in the last 
surveyed year (2003) indicates that sector or branch level collective bargaining 
completed with the finn level bargaining dominate in nearly every second 
European countries. The so-called multi-employer collective bargaining at sector 
level still dominates the wage-setting in the EU-15 countries. There are big 
differences conceming the importance of various bargaining levels within the 
national bargaining structures. In the EU-15 countries involved in the Leonardo 
Project, the cross-industry level wage bargaining was found in Belgium and the 
company level bargaining was dominant in Francé and in the UK. As conceming 
the UK, we have to note that this is the only country from among the EU-15 
countries where almost all bargaining takes piacé at firm level. Similarly to the 
British case, in the new Member States, the company level bargaining dominates 
with the exception of Slovakia (see in details the Table 9!).
Beside the forms of the decentralisation of wage bargaining, there are other tools 
of wage regulation which may improve the flexibility of employment and 
knowledge use. Various forms of coordination may facilitate decentralisation 
and improve flexibility of labour relation system: “Coordination based on shared 
understanding and mutual trust may be more important than centralisation of 
wage-setting. This is perhaps the strongest lesson from the experience of social 
pacts — many of which were fully unexpected and negotiated in rather 
fragmented and decentralised wage-setting structures. A shared understanding of 
the economic and social context, and of key mechanisms driving growth, 
productivity and employment, greatly increases the probability of wage- 
bargaining being conducted in a cooperative way, in which each party has an 
eye on their own long-term self-interest and the common good, and nőt only to 
their short-term interest or purely sectional concems.” (Industrial Relations in 
Europe, 2004: 44.)
Evaluating the types of coordination, we may use the following scale. One 
extreme of the scale represents the ‘explicit’ coordination. However, this type of 
coordination covers various forms: fírstly, coordination exists between peak 
organisations of either trade unions or employers materialised in agreements at 
national or sectoral level (i.e. bipartite interest concertation). Secondly, explicit 
coordination may develop in cases when social partners agree to behave 
according to commonly accepted rules with or without govemment participation 
(i.e. tripartite interest concertation). On the middle of the scale of coordination 
of wage bargaining are located various forms of ‘implicit’ coordination. The 
strongest form of this type of coordination is based on the norm or trend-setting 
role of a leading trade unión or employers’ group dominating one sector at 
national or régiónál level. In other cases (which represent the weaker versions of 
‘implicit’ coordination), social partners intend to inform each other of their 
ambitions fór the wage-setting. When social partners rely on this form of 
coordination, they do nőt wish either to set a clear guideline or to reach
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agreement on wage related issues. The fifth type equals no coordination. Table 
10 illustrates the location of the countries participating in the Leonardo project 
on the scale of wage-bargaining coordination.
Table 9. Levels o f  wage bargaining and duration o f  collective agreements, 2003
National Sector Company
Duration of 
contracts (vear)
Belgium *** ** * 2
Francé * * * * 2?
Germany *** * 1-2
Spain * * * ** 2-3
Hungary * * *** 2
Poland * »»* Variable
Slovakia * ♦♦ ** 2
UK *** Variable
NB: *** = principle or dominant bargaining level; ** = important bút nőt dominant 
level; * = existing level of bargaining. Sources: Adapted from EIRO publications. 
Quoted by Industrial Relations in Europe, 2004:, 39. Table 9. is an edited version of the 
original one containing data only fór countries involved in the Leonardo Project.
Table 10. Coordination o f wage bargaining
Types of coordination
Belgium Explicit coordination in National Labour Council, little sectoral coordination 4 0.61
Francé Irregular implicit coordination through pattem-setting in the public sector and nationalised industries 1.5 0.37
Germany Implicit coordination through comprehensive sectoral bargaining and pattem-setting 3 0.43
Spain
Somé explicit coordination between confederations of unions and 
employers in recent years and weak pattem-setting in sectoral 
bargaining
3 0.48
Hungary Somé national coordination through the tripartite body, no sectoral coordination 2 0.28
Poland No national or sectoral coordination 1 0.21
Slovakia No national coordination since 2000, somé sectoral coordination 2 0.31
UK No national or sectoral coordination 1 0.19
NB: 5 = Explicit coordination between and within the peak association of unions and 
employers, through agreements at the national and sectoral level; 4 = Explicit 
coordination between peak federations through agreements at national level only, or 
implicit coordination in confederations (unions or employers) at the national and 
sectoral level; 3 = Implicit coordination through synchronisation of sectoral bargaining 
and pattem-setting; 2 = Somé coordination through supervision and weak, irregular or 
incomplete pattem-setting; 1= No coordination at the national or sectoral level. 
Weighted with coverage rate.
Quoted by Industrial Relations in Europe, 2004: 45. Table 10 is an edited version of 
the original one containing data only fór countries involved in the Leonardo Project.
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The findings of the Table 10 call attention to the following three groups of the 
countries in relation to the wage-bargaining coordination. Only Belgium 
maintained or reintroduced somé forms of explicit coordination at the national 
level. In Germany and Spain -  where central agreements have set guidelines fór 
wage conduct since 2001 -  the implicit coordination characterises the relations 
between social partners. Pattems setting practice exists in Germany and the 
implicit coordination characterises the French wage-bargaining coordination. 
Finally, in the UK, similarly to Poland, both national or sectoral levels 
coordination are missing.
It is worth noting that: “The tradition of national wage agreements, existing in 
Slovakia, faltered in the laté 1990s and the last such agreement was concluded in 
2000. Attempts to reach agreement in Poland stalled in 2003. In Hungary, 
however, there have been fresh initiatives. Usually the legal status of a national 
agreement is a non-binding recommendation to lower level bargainers, bút there 
is little coordination, within or between confederations, or in sectors, to pút 
pressure behind such recommendations or monitor their follow-up.” (Industrial 
Relations in Europe, 2004: 46.)
Annex 1 LEONARDO Community Vocational Training Action 
Programme,
(2003-3448/001-00l-LE2_OREF, Contract start date: 01. October 2003, 
Duration 36 Months (01. 10. 2003 -  30. 09. 2006)
Partners:
Belgium:
Francé:
Germany:
Hungary:
EHSAL, Brussels 
Université Paris X, Nanterre 
Wismar University; Wismar
Institute of Sociology, Hungárián Academy of 
Sciences; Budapest
Institute of Labour and Social Studies; Warsaw 
UNED; Madrid
Institute fór Sociology, Slovak Academy of Sciences; 
Bratislava
University of Luton, Luton
Poland:
Spain:
Slovakia:
UK:
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